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LEGAL DUTY BEYOND BORDERS:  
VALUE PLURALISM AND THE POSSIBILITY  
OF COSMOPOLITAN LAW 
WILLIAM F. HELMKEN

 
INTRODUCTION 
In a globalized world, the United States has moved toward a legal 
framework that sanctions a variety of extraterritorial grants of jurisdiction. 
National security law and political and legal theory have become 
increasingly focused on whether the United States can, absent obvious 
Constitutional considerations,
1
 theoretically justify its increasing 
expansion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. For example, the United States 
has expanded extraterritorial jurisdiction to individuals at Guantanamo 
Bay and Bagram Theater Internment Facility,
2
 as well as to individuals 
seeking redress in U.S. courts under the Alien Torts Statute (―ATS‖),3 the 
Torture Protection Act (―TPA‖),4 or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(―FSIA‖).5 Despite this trend towards extraterritorial jurisdiction and the 
increasing prominence of international law, the United States has 
 
 
   Executive Articles Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. Candidate 
(2012), Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See generally Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851 (2010) (arguing that U.S. courts must determine whether 
Congress has been authorized by the Constitution to abrogate the fundamental right to judicial review 
of the legality of a detention as a condition precedent to discussing applicable rights of detainees under 
the balancing test articulated by Justice Stevens in Boumediene).  
 2. Bagram Theater Internment Facility is a detention facility in Afghanistan similar to the one at 
Guantanamo Bay. JONATHAN HAFTEZ, HABEAS CORUPUS AFTER 9/11: CONFRONTING AMERICA‘S 
NEW GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM 48 (2011). 
 3. The Alien Tort Statute provides that: ―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)  
 4. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991). 
 5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (1976). Section 1605 provides for exceptions to grants of sovereign 
immunity, permitting jurisdiction against a foreign state, for example, ―upon an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere 
and that act causes direct effect in the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Section 1605 also provides for 
exceptions to grants of sovereign immunity, permitting jurisdiction against a foreign state 
for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if 
such an act. . . is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such a foreign state while 
acting within the scope of his or her office, employment or agency. 
 28 U.S.C. § 1605(A). 
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historically relied on a political concept of legal duty, which maintains that 
moral and legal duties are defined by political association.
6
 Under this 
concept of duty, extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on consent. Thus, a 
tension exists between our political reality and moral and political theory, 
calling for reconciliation on a theoretical level. Cosmopolitans, in contrast 
to those espousing the political conception of legal duty, advocate an 
expansive notion of moral and legal duty, a notion which transcends 
political boundaries irrespective of consent. This Note serves two goals. 
First, it demonstrates that both cosmopolitan and value pluralist theory 
offer compelling critiques of the political concept of duty founded on the 
liberal principles of John Rawls and John Locke. Second, it analyzes 
compatibility of these alternative theories of political morality and their 
implications for our understanding of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Cosmopolitan theory and value pluralism both challenge the 
assumptions of Lockean and Rawlsian liberalism by arguing that the 
political concept of legal duty offered by liberals is theoretically flawed 
and fails to comport with the current state of positive law. Cosmopolitans 
are critical of the political conception of the law because it implies that 
where there is no consent, and thus political association there can be no 
justified legal duty.
7
 Cosmopolitans argue that political borders are 
morally arbitrary, and that moral and legal duties transcend political 
associations. Value pluralists go further and claim that not only is the 
political concept of a legal duty flawed, but liberalism itself is 
problematic.
8
 While value pluralism as a theory of value does not offer an 
explicit alternative account of positive law or international law, 
 
 
 6. This Note addresses whether states have moral and legal obligations irrespective of their 
respective treaty or other consent-based obligations such that they can justify extending domestic law 
to govern conduct by non-citizens abroad. While international law embraces the concept of customary 
international law including jus cogens norms, this Note emphasizes the potential problems in using 
extraterritorial jurisdiction as means of unilaterally enforcing violations of norms of international law, 
and particularly, civil, political, economic and social norms that lack the same degree of consensus in 
the international community. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, 1155 UNTS 
331, 344 (May 23, 1969) [hereinafter VCLT] (―A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it 
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present 
Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the 
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and 
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same 
character.‖).  
 7. I use the term political association narrowly, including only those states that appear to have a 
working legal system that seeks to guard against arbitrary conduct. This concept, therefore, excludes 
failed or failing states where there is, de facto, no meaningful system of positive law. 
 8. The majority of cosmopolitan theory endorses comprehensive liberal political values. The 
value pluralists critique of cosmopolitans is primarily targeted at what it perceives to be an unjustified 
claim that liberal political values enjoy superiority over non-western political moralities. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/5
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cosmopolitanism raises the possibility of an alternative account of moral 
and legal duty through the view called minimalist legal cosmopolitanism. 
Minimalist legal cosmopolitanism is ―the normative view that some law 
must apply to every person as well as to every action‖9 such that ―no 
conduct or person should be deemed ‗off the grid,‘ legally speaking, 
because of the morally arbitrary accident of where the person is or where 
the conduct occurs.‖10 Cosmopolitan theorists argue that coercion is 
justified in limited circumstances against certain heinous conduct 
wherever it may occur: if each legal system rests on the assumption that 
the law‘s purpose is to guard individuals from arbitrary acts, then in order 
for the total set of global legal systems to be legitimate, they are 
collectively required to ensure all individuals against arbitrary treatment.
11
  
Minimalist legal cosmopolitanism suggests that conduct beyond United 
States‘ borders may not only create a right for coercive state action against 
certain conduct, but may equally create an obligation for action in limited 
cases.
12
 Nonetheless, this position suggests that issues such as torture, 
genocide, and potentially the detention of alleged violent extremists may 
be required when such activity falls ―off the legal radar‖ of any country 
because (1) the inadequate enforcement of local laws or (2) the lack of a 
minimally justifiable legal framework where individuals are treated in an 
arbitrary fashion. Therefore, while Boumediene v. Bush held that the writ 
of habeas corpus could reach non-citizens who are beyond United States‘ 
territory,
13
 a minimalist legal cosmopolitan or pluralist may nonetheless 
warrant various extraterritorial legal action to detain
14
 or aid non-citizens, 
or provide for sanctions against corporations,
15
 on cosmopolitan grounds 
 
 
 9. Noah Feldman, Cosmopolitan Law?, 116 YALE L.J. 1022, 1066 (2007). 
 10. Id.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796–97 (2008).  
 14. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–32. While denying a private right of 
action under the Alien Tort Statute for arbitrary arrest, Justice Souter together with six members of the 
Supreme Court cautiously accepted the possibility of the recognizing new violations of the Alien Tort 
Statute besides those recognized by the drafter of the statute when such violations are specific, 
obligatory and universal. In this case, however, Justice Souter was ―persuaded that federal courts 
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law 
norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations that the historical paradigms 
familiar with § 1350 was enacted.‖ Id. at 732 (internal citations omitted).  
 15. See, e.g., Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2011); 
accord Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 40–41 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Romero v. Drummond Co., 
552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008) (―The text of the Alien Tort Statute provides no express 
exception for corporations, and the law of this Circuit is that this statute grants jurisdiction from 
complaints of torture against corporate defendants.‖). But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of not treating conduct arbitrarily merely because of where it occurs.
16
  
I argue, first, that while cosmopolitanism conflicts with the thesis of 
value pluralism, a ―minimalist‖ moral cosmopolitanism, properly 
circumscribed, can be construed as consistent with value pluralism.
17
 
Second, I argue that despite their theoretical affinities, value pluralism 
offers a compelling critique of both liberalism and cosmopolitanism, and 
their respective attempts to justify an extraterritorial legal, as opposed to a 
moral, duty to sanction conduct beyond our borders in the absence of 
substantial consensus on norms of conduct. For pluralists, the 
cosmopolitan‘s attempt to derive an extraterritorial legal duty creates 
significant dangers, and is likely to result in the prioritization and 
imposition of one culture‘s norms and laws on another culture. In Part I, I 
provide an account of the political concept of legal duty, cosmopolitanism, 
and minimalist legal cosmopolitanism. In Part II, I illustrate the subversive 
implications of value pluralism for the political concept of duty and for 
liberal political morality generally. In Part III, I demonstrate that despite 
the merits and similarities of minimalist legal cosmopolitanism, value 
pluralism provides a compelling challenge to any coherent account of 
extraterritorial legal duties absent traditional mechanisms of consent such 
as treaties, and in doing so, embraces a diverse moral world where borders 
are becoming increasingly anachronistic and duties more difficult to 
discern. 
I. COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE POLITICAL CONCEPT OF LEGAL DUTY 
In his famous jurisprudential puzzle of the case of the speluncean 
explorers, Lon L. Fuller framed the problem of extraterritorial moral and 
legal duties succinctly:
18
 a group of five men trapped in a cave receive 
news via radio that physicians have determined they will starve before 
they can be rescued. The men agree that one is to be killed to ensure the 
 
 
621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), pet. for reh‘g denied, 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011), pet. for reh‘g en banc 
denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted (U.S. Sup. Ct. No. 10-1491 Oct. 7, 2011). 
 16. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25, 732 
(quoting approvingly Filartiga and identifying that case as the ―birth of the modern line of [ATS] 
cases‖).  
 17. Value pluralism is the theory that there are objective moral values, but they are plural and 
incommensurable such that they are constitutively non-combinable. Value pluralists insist on a 
baseline of consent on norms to determine the validity of extraterritorial jurisdiction to cover third 
parties, but unlike many positivist theories, do not require formal treaty-like consent. Value pluralism 
is discussed in detail in Part II. 
 18. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 64 HARV. L. REV. 616 
(1949).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/5
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survival of the other four. Subsequently, the four are tried for the murder 
of the fifth man. Are these men outside the purview of a moral or legal 
framework because of the morally arbitrary fact that they were ―outside‖ a 
political association, or are they subject to positive law against murder? 
In the contemporary context, extraterritorial moral and legal problems 
abound. The operation of terror training camps inside Waziristan in 
northwest Pakistan are not immune from some legal system, yet the 
terrorist acts appear to be de facto outside the scope of any law.
 
In the case 
of torture, international law,
19
 treaties,
20
 and the laws of nearly every state 
prohibit torture. The ATS and TPA also create a cause of action for 
extraterritorial torture. Absent a treaty or political necessity, is the United 
States under a legal obligation to punish torture abroad? Government-
backed militias in Sudan have committed atrocious campaigns of terror, 
murder, and rape of southern Sudanese in the Darfur region, eventually 
leading to the formation of the Republic of South Sudan by plebiscite.
21
 
Are the acts of the militiamen in southern Sudan, either pre- or post-
secession ―off the legal radar‖? Are they under the authority of Sudanese 
law? Is the global set of legal systems under a legal duty to ensure that no 
act falls outside of some law? The traditional cosmopolitan answer is that 
moral and legal duties extend beyond political borders. While against 
arbitrary violence and torture, value pluralists insist when it comes to less 
compelling areas such as civil and political rights, local values should be 
given substantial deference. For the pluralist, well-being is linked to local 
communal forms of life. Creating a legal duty to remedy certain anti-
western, unsavory activity often creates an unjustifiable ranking of one set 
of values over another.
22
 Pluralists are thus less willing to extend 
 
 
 19. See, e.g., Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 876, 884 (―Having examined the sources from which 
customary international law is derived—the usage of nations, judicial opinions, and works of jurists—
we conclude that the official torture is now prohibited. The prohibition is clear and unambiguous, and 
admits of no distinction between the treatment of aliens and citizens.‖) (footnote omitted).  
 20. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (1988) (―No exceptional circumstances whatsoever . . . may be invoked as a 
justification of torture.‖). 
 21. Jeffery Gettleman, After Years of Struggle, Southern Sudan Becomes a New Nation, N.Y. 
TIMES, July, 10, 2011, at A6.  
 22. Pluralists vigorously oppose torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity on the grounds 
that they are acts of arbitrary violence. While pluralists insist that legal action against these crimes 
may be justified, they argue that it is problematic to extend jurisdiction to cover international 
violations of distinctly western political morality such as civil and political rights, which may be 
legitimately rejected by local governments. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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jurisdiction to cover activity abroad unless it concerns violating certain 
minimal norms, specifically those against arbitrary violence.
23
 
Cosmopolitanism can be seen as either an attempt to supplement or 
supplant contractarian theories of justice, and particularly Rawlsian moral 
constructivism.
24
 Martha Nussbaum proposes a cosmopolitan theory that 
seeks to ground moral obligations in the fact of living as social animals 
with certain capabilities irrespective of our political association. Noah 
Feldman offers a radical, and as I argue, problematic, extension of 
Nussbaum‘s and other cosmopolitan theories by attempting to justify 
cosmopolitan law through the idea of minimalist legal cosmopolitanism. 
A. Contract Theory and Justification of the Modern Liberal State 
In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls attempts to provide a basis for 
global justice based on moral constructivism. I suggest that Rawls‘s 
hypothetical consent model fails to support or contemplate limited 
assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The dual ideas that animate 
Rawls‘s moral constructivism, and thus his theory of justice as fairness, 
are the original position and the veil of ignorance. In order to reach a just 
or fair organization of society, it is necessary to imagine what principles 
would be agreed to by people who have no knowledge of certain facts 
about themselves.
25
 For Rawls, principles of justice serve to ―govern the 
assignment of rights and duties and to regulate the distribution of social 
and economic advantages.‖26 They are to be understood as the principles 
that would emerge as a hypothetical contract or agreement reached by 
people ignorant of facts about their particular circumstances including 
beliefs and capabilities.
27
  
The principles that emerge in Rawls‘s original position depends on 
what people are ignorant of in the original position and on what 
information they possess behind the veil of ignorance. Most crudely, 
Rawls denies that people in the original position will know their position 
in society and their natural endowments because the distribution of these 
 
 
 23. While a pluralist conception of minimal moral norms would be substantially similar to 
international norms that have jus cogens status, the precise relationship between pluralist morality and 
jus cogens norms is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 24. I focus almost exclusively on Martha Nussbaum‘s cosmopolitan argument and Noah 
Feldman‘s proposal to extend her argument as a basis for conceiving of a legal duty absent any 
political association. My arguments, however, apply equally to other theories of cosmopolitanism. 
 25. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 53 (1971). 
 26. Id. 
 27. STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SWIFT, LIBERALS & COMMUNITARIANS 3 (1992). 
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attributes are ―arbitrary from a moral point of view.‖28 Moreover, Rawls 
proposes that in the original position, behind the veil of ignorance, people 
lack any concept of the good, of what makes certain forms of life more 
valuable than others.
29
 Equally critical, is an appreciation of the 
substantive claims about justice that are embodied by the conception of the 
veil of ignorance.
30
 Implicit in the denial of knowledge of any concept of 
the good is a concept of liberty that does not prize any particular concept 
of the good (or form of life) over another, but which prizes the freedom to 
act upon, change, and revise their own particular concept of the good.
31
  
The concept of rationality that exists behind the veil of ignorance is 
framed as a proto-Kantian vision of mutually disinterested rationality.
32
 
Rawls claims, ―since differences among parties are unknown to them, and 
everyone is equally rational and similarly situated, each is convinced by 
the same arguments.‖33 Mutually disinterested rationality leads to the 
recognition that individuals should promote ―the highest index of primary 
social goods, since this enables them to promote their conception of the 
good whatever it turns out to be.‖34 In an analogy to sports, Rawls 
contends that parties ―strive for as high and absolute score as possible. 
They do not wish a high or low score for their opponents.‖35 
For Rawls, people in the original position, denied of knowledge, talents 
and endowments, and not animated by any concept of the good, but 
sharing in a common rationality that prizes autonomous decision making, 
would arrive at agreement that a society should be regulated by two 
principles, lexically ranked.
36
 First, ―each person is to have an equal right 
to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with 
a similar system of liberty for all.‖37 Second, ―social and economic 
inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest 
 
 
 28. RAWLS, supra note 25, at 14. 
 29. There has been significant criticism of this point. The most prominent criticism is that, by 
purportedly denying concepts of the good to people in the original position while prizing autonomous 
decision-making, Rawls is taking a substantive moral position in which autonomy places a central role. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. The original position therefore stands for the substantive moral position that, to justify a 
theory of justice, one must value liberty defined as freedom to make choice, of autonomy as self-
authorship. 
 32. RAWLS, supra note 25, at 120. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. at 125. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 266. 
 37. RAWLS, supra note 25, at 53. 
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benefit of the least advantaged, and (b) attached to offices and positions 
open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.‖38 
For Rawls, people in the original position will rationally decide that the 
first principle will have lexical priority over the second,
39
 and that within 
the second principle, the fair equality of opportunity embodied in (b) will 
have priority over (a).
40
 The equality and liberty principles of Rawls 
theory relate to aspects of the original position in that individuals will be 
principally concerned with restrictions on liberty, and only secondarily 
with the egalitarian concerns.
41
 Therefore, Rawls claims that, in the 
original position, behind the veil of ignorance, individual members of 
society would rationally agree to a system of welfare or redistribution that 
would ensure that the worst-off person was at least as comfortable as he 
would have been under conditions of strict egalitarian redistribution. 
Rawls‘ argument in A Theory of Justice is premised on the level of a 
single political association, leaving those outside the distributive 
arrangement subject to different moral and legal duties than those inside it.  
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls extends his moral constructivism from 
the domestic to the international sphere in an attempt to provide 
foundation for a theory of international justice.
42
 In doing so, Rawls makes 
the domestic consensus a condition precedent to an international bargain 
between peoples, in a second original position.
43
 By conditioning global 
justice on a domestic agreement on principles of justice, Rawls retains the 
statist paradigm in moral theory, which takes political agreement as 
fundamental. After the consensus is reached on the domestic level, various 
kinds of regimes or people reach agreement on first principles of justice to 
 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. MULHALL & SWIFT, supra note 27, at 7–8. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. at 7–8. Mulhall and Swift explain the relation of the principles generated by the original 
position as follows: 
The principle of equal basic liberty derives directly from the people in the original position‘s 
ignorance of, and concern to protect their freedom to choose, change and pursue their own 
conceptions of the good, while the second principle, and especially the difference principle, 
derives from their ignorance of their own likely position in the distribution of social and 
economic advantage. . . . [Therefore] it is rational for them to maximin, to ensure that the 
worst is as good as it can be, and this leads them to support equality unless inequality will 
actually help the worse-off position.  
Id. at 8. 
 42. Rawls later work expanded his heuristic device of hypothetical, rational agreement to a 
global scale, effectively making Rawlsian redistribution akin to a global contractarianism.I do not 
attempt to address Rawls‘s argument for global justice on this occasion. See generally JOHN RAWLS, 
THE LAW OF PEOPLES 32 (1999). 
 43. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss1/5
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guide a global citizenry based on what peoples would agree to in the 
original position.
44
 Thomas Pogge has also elaborated on this approach in 
attempting to create a theory of global mutual obligation based on the 
heuristic device of hypothetical, rational consensus.
45
 Pogge accomplished 
the cosmopolitan goal of conferring rights and obligations on people 
everywhere irrespective of their state or type of political association based 
on the Rawlsian heuristic of the original position.
46
 For the cosmopolitans, 
moral duties are discernible from the fact that humans possess certain 
fundamental rights or capabilities and not from a global hypothetical 
consensus.
47
  
B. The Cosmopolitan Response: A World Without Strangers  
Cosmopolitanism generally flows from the premise that every human 
being‘s life is equally valuable irrespective of membership in any political 
association.
48
 In political and legal theory, cosmopolitanism is an 
explication of Diogenes the Cynic‘s famous maxim. When Diogenes, a 
stranger and not an Athenian citizen, was asked where he came from, he 
replied that he was a citizen of the world.
49
 Diogenes‘ cryptic remark has 
been interpreted as implying that the boundaries of the polis–indeed any 
political boundary–are morally arbitrary, and thus to be a citizen is to feel 
the common bond between humans as inhabitants of the world.
50
 Thomas 
Pogge defines cosmopolitanism as follows: 
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitans positions. First, 
individualism: the ultimate unit of concern are human beings, or 
persons—rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or 
religious communities, nations or states. . . . Second, universality: 
the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living human 
being equally—not merely to some subset as men, aristocrats, 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS (1989).  
 45. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1029. 
 46. Id. at 1030. For Rawls, however, the moral duty to others is derived from the hypothetical 
agreement between peoples. RAWLS, supra note 42. 
 47. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE (2006); KWAME A. APPIAH, ETHICS 
OF IDENTITY (2005). While Nussbaum does not use the word cosmopolitan, her capabilities approach 
can clearly be characterized as cosmopolitan in view of its goals and implications. 
 48. Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1667, 1670 
(2003). There is considerable variety in the approaches taken under the banner of cosmopolitan theory 
of which moral cosmopolitanism is the most prevalent in contemporary theory. 
 49. Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism BOSTON REV. (Oct./Nov., 1994), 
available at http://bostonreview.net/BR19.5/nussbaum.php. 
 50. Id. 
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Aryans, whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status 
has global force. Persons are ultimate units of concern for 
everyone—not only for their compatriots, fellow religionists, or 
such like.
51
 
By rooting morality in the commonality of humanity (or sociability and 
concerns over well-being, for Nussbaum), cosmopolitans
52
 enhance the 
moral burden (either of individuals or states) toward strangers and 
attenuate the attachment of duties dictated by the nation or state‘s positive 
law.
53
  
Two strands of cosmopolitan theory are prevalent in political and legal 
theory: (1) Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach, embodied in her 
institutional cosmopolitanism; and (2) that of individualist moral 
cosmopolitans such as Simon Caney. Moral and institutional 
cosmopolitanism represents a challenge to Rawlsian contractarianism as a 
theory for moral obligations.
54
 For a moral cosmopolitan, a moral duty to 
others typically vests on an individual level, not the level of peoples, and 
thus reflects the commitment to the individualist, generality and equality 
conditions identified by Pogge.
55
 Nussbaum‘s institutional 
cosmopolitanism, however, is distinct from most cosmopolitan theories in 
that she argues that the duty to others is derived from concerns over well-
being (as opposed to individual rights) and that such a duty vests not on 
individuals but in the domestic institutions of a political association such 
as a national government because there are a variety of ―plausibility 
limitations‖ on individual action that preclude these duties from being the 
duties of individuals.
56
 For Nussbaum, individuals are not capable of 
establishing ―a just global order through human psychology alone‖57 
because humans are imperfect, selfish, plagued by misinformation, and 
 
 
 51. SIMON CANEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS 3–4 (2006) (footnotes omitted) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Pogge). Cultural cosmopolitanism does not share the premises espoused by Pogge, and are in 
many respects similar to value pluralists. Nonetheless, this definition captures the essence of the 
cosmopolitan position. 
 52. I focus mainly on Nussbaum‘s version of cosmopolitanism because I take it to be the most 
compelling account of the cosmopolitan thesis. 
 53. Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 1670.  
 54. MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY AND SPECIES 
MEMBERSHIP 37 (2006).  
 55. CANEY, supra note 51. Caney‘s position provides a compelling argument in favor of human 
rights based on the individual as the relevant unit-a position that comports with the current 
understanding of human rights under international law.  
 56. Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 1671.  
 57. Id. at 1670 (quoting Martha Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism, Castle Lecture 4 
at Yale University 2 (Mar. 1, 2000)). 
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―assigning responsibilities to people one by one is a recipe for a massive 
collective action problem.‖58 Nussbaum concludes that a just global order 
can only be secured through institutions because ―political institutions that 
embody a moral ideal can coerce morally adequate results in the absence 
of even a single perfect human being‖59 and thus secure a fair distribution 
of the burdens required to strangers through international institutions.
60 
 
First, Nussbaum‘s cosmopolitan approach does not start with the 
philosophical anthropology of mutual advantage or selfishness that is the 
foundation of the liberalisms of Locke, Hobbes, and Rawls. Rather, 
following Grotius, Nussbaum insists that the fact of human sociability 
suggests that advantage is not the only motivation for humans to act 
justly.
61
 Nussbaum proposes the idea that justice is grounded in what she 
famously refers to as human capabilities, which are universal capacities 
that everyone in the world shares and without which one cannot live a life 
worthy of any basic concept of human flourishing or dignity.
62
 Moreover, 
Nussbaum‘s capabilities approach is explicitly consequentialist in that ―it 
begins with the basic human capabilities, then works backward to develop 
an account of justice that assures that people everywhere will be entitled to 
exercise those capabilities.‖63 Insofar as capabilities establish conditions of 
justice for all people, and that national boundaries are morally arbitrary 
because they do not adequately address capabilities of strangers, 
Nussbaum‘s account of justice is distinctly cosmopolitan and differs from 
deontological rights-based theories.
64
  
 
 
 58. Id. at 1671 (quoting Martha Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism, Castle Lecture, 
15–16). 
 59. Id. (quoting Martha Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism, Castle Lecture, 3). 
Nussbaum suggests that national governments should create international institutions to ensure that 
certain international issues are adequately remedied. According to Nussbaum, international institutions 
would include the following: 
[A] world court that would deal with grave human rights violations; a set of world 
environmental regulations, plus a tax on industrial nations of the North to support 
development of pollution controls of the South; a set of global trade regulations that would try 
to harness the juggernaut of globalization to a set of moral goals for human development . . . ; 
a set of global labor standards . . . ; and, finally, various forms of global taxation that would 
effect wealth transfers from richer to poorer nations. 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Martha Nussbaum, Toward a Viable Cosmopolitanism, Castle 
Lecture, 16).  
 60. Id. 
 61. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1035–36 (―Grotius argues explicitly that we must not attempt to 
derive our fundamental principles from an idea of mutual advantage alone; human sociability indicates 
that advantage is not the only reason for which humans beings act justly.‖) (quoting MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 37 (2006)).  
 62. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1036.  
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1037. 
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As to the well-being justification, Nussbaum defends civil and political 
rights as necessary only because they are integral to human flourishing, 
which she insists is the overarching or primary interest of a person.
65
 A 
theory of justice premised on well-being must, at least for Nussbaum, 
recognize persons‘ equal moral standing, a moral status accorded to them 
by being human. A second step in her argument, and one shared by value 
pluralists, is that human ―rights‖ are informed or dictated by a person‘s 
interests; in this case, an interest in a derivative concern for well-being 
such as basic sustenance can dictate a right to be free from hunger. A 
―right‖ ultimately rests on protecting an aspect of a persons‘ well-being (or 
interest).
66
  
This leads Nussbaum to identify ten human goods or capabilities 
necessary for any account of the good life, including (1) ―life‖; (2) ―bodily 
health‖; (3) ―bodily integrity‖; (4) ―senses, imagination and thought‖; 
(5) ―emotions‖; (6) ―practical reason‖; (7) ―affiliation,‖ comprising 
―friendship‖ and ―respect‖; (8) ―other species‖; (9) ―play‖; and 
(10) ―control over one‘s environment,‖ including both political and 
material environment.
67
 The justification of liberal civil and political rights 
is premised on her argument, which is arguably nothing more than a 
wager—that well-being is best served by a set of liberal civil and political 
rights.
68
  
Nussbaum‘s cosmopolitanism of capabilities seeks to establish a 
minimal system of global governance with limited coercive powers in 
order to ensure that capabilities
69
 are respected both inside and outside the 
boundaries of the polis. Through securing basic capabilities through 
institutions, global welfare and individual well-being will be enhanced as a 
consequence not of any utilitarian motivation, but by according equal 
dignity to everyone as possessing capabilities as human beings worthy of 
some threshold of basic dignity.
70
 This flows from her concern that justice 
 
 
 65. Martha Nussbaum, Capabilities of Human Rights, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND TRANSNATIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 117, 136, 138–39 
(Pablo De Greidd & Ciarian Cronin eds., 2002).  
 66. CANEY, supra note 51, at 73. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Nussbaum‘s capabilities or substantial freedoms are essential primary preconditions for well-
being. For a summary of her theory of capabilities, See, e.g., Jan Garrett, Martha Nussbaum on 
Capbilities and Human Rights (Dec. 2, 2003), http://people.wku.edu/jan.garrett/nussbaum.htm. 
 70. See generally Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1667 (2003) (arguing that Nussbaum‘s institutional turn–establishing moral obligations to strangers 
that inhere in institutions and not individuals–is subject to a significant feasibility limitations given the 
current state of the international system). 
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should focus on the unchosen fact of being human–possessing certain 
capabilities–over the Lockean or Rawlsian notion of moral duties 
premised on hypothetical consent between diverse liberal and decent 
peoples. While Nussbaum‘s argument provides a compelling account of 
why we have a moral duty to ensure a threshold of capabilities (akin to 
Rawls‘s concept of primary goods), it does not necessarily create a 
justified legal duty on all third party legal systems to protect such 
capabilities. 
C. The Political Conception of Law and Cosmopolitan Law 
Feldman notes that, in order to properly appreciate the possibility of 
cosmopolitan law, it is critical to appreciate how we think a law is justified 
within the polis.
71
 To repeat, the liberal view frames moral duty as a 
product of consent—explicitly or tacitly (the Lockean view), or 
hypothetically between Peoples (the Kantian or Rawlsian view).
72
 On 
either theory of consent, liberal theory ―makes entrance into political 
agreement a condition precedent for the imposition of justifiable legal 
duty.‖73 Cosmopolitans are critical of the political conception of the law 
because it implies that where there is no political membership, there can 
be no justified legal duty.
74
 Therefore, the political concept of legal duty of 
Rawlsian or Lockean liberalism cannot adequately justify extraterritorial 
grants of jurisdiction because this amounts to a selective extension of law 
only to certain strangers and not others.
75
  
Feldman brings the later point into focus by demonstrating the 
theoretical lacunae in the political concept of legal duty and certain 
legislative grants of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
76
 For example, the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 402
77
 articulates principles that permit extraterritorial grants of 
jurisdiction on individuals acting outside the United States with no 
 
 
 71. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1049.  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. (footnote omitted).  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 1053. Feldman argues that the Foreign Relation Law of the United States does not 
comport with a purely political conception of legal duty because it contemplates enforcing U.S. law on 
foreign activity. For Feldman, these anomalies are theoretically more consistent with his notion of 
minimalist legal cosmopolitanism than traditional political concept of legal duty. Id. 
 76. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1054. 
 77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
(1987). 
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cognizable contact with the United States.
78
 How can extraterritorial 
jurisdiction be explained in a coherent way by the political concept of 
legal duty? For example, the ATS
79
 confers subject matter jurisdiction on 
certain acts that constitute a tort irrespective of where they occurred and 
the TPA
80
 equally creates liability in U.S. courts against anyone who 
engages in ―extra judicial torture or killing outside the United States under 
color of law.‖81  
One answer is that the international community—or an international 
body formed by treaty, such as the International Court of Justice—is a 
sufficiently compelling political association to make international norms 
legal duties. While this may be the case, Feldman argues more radically 
that the most philosophically compelling way to explain ATS and the TPA 
is by departing from the political concept of legal duty and instead 
demonstrating that association with the United States or an international 
institution is unnecessary to find a justified legal duty. If association with a 
political entity, however abstractly conceived, is unnecessary to justify 
legal duties, then legal duties may extend beyond political boundaries to 
all conduct at any place or time. 
Feldman maintains that a cosmopolitan conception of the law is 
capable of reaching all people everywhere, regardless of political 
association.
82
 First, Feldman argues that:  
the institutional pedigree of a law is not necessarily relevant to the 
existence of a natural duty to comply with it. In fact, I want to 
propose that there may be a natural duty to obey a truly just law 
even if it was not promulgated by a state (or states) at all.
83
  
Next, Feldman identifies a fallacy that leads to the adoption of the political 
concept of legal duty. According to this view, laws are considered just 
when they are promulgated by a political organization. Thus, the character 
 
 
 78. Id.  
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Dolly Filártiga brought the first ATS case on behalf of her 
seventeen-year-old brother, who was tortured and killed by Paraguyan police. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 
878. 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991). 
 81. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1054 (footnote omitted).  
 82. Id. at 1056–57. While Feldman concedes that political associations may create justifiable 
laws—potentially Rawlsian liberal constructivism, for example—he nonetheless suggests that 
―[p]erhaps the coercive imposition of legal duty could be justified on the basis of some other principle 
that would extend to people and places everywhere, regardless of whether they had ever been in a 
political association.‖ Id. Feldman‘s claim appears to rely on an endorsement of natural law theory to 
justify extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction. The argument he advances, however, does not address 
the relation between natural law and universal jurisdiction. 
 83. Id. at 1059. 
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of justice is borrowed from the institution that promulgates the law. 
Feldman notes that this depends ―on the idea that laws properly so called 
always come into existence from the top down‖84 because ―assurance of 
cooperation is a key feature of justice,‖85 which in turn can only be 
provided if the number of institutions addressing the problem are limited. 
For Feldman, however, a just law, and consequently an entire legal 
system, can be built piecemeal even in the absence of an overarching state 
serving to ensure cooperation with the norms being promulgated as just 
laws; legal duties and their enforcement need not be top-down. Even in the 
absence of coercive power there may be just laws that are worthy of 
obedience. Feldman characterizes this proposition as follows: 
A monopoly on force may be a condition of the modern state, but if 
I am right that there can be law without states, it is not a condition 
of law. In brief, a norm only modestly and incompetently enforced 
can be just, and it can be law. . . .  
. . . .  
. . . Certain asserted international laws could be just, and there could 
be a natural duty to obey them, not because they derive from a 
political association of states, but simply because they are, in fact, 
just. These laws need not be backed by the threat of force from an 
overarching international association; but it might well be justifiable 
to enforce them through coercion.
86
 
The salience of Feldman‘s proposition lies mainly in his justification for 
extraterritorial, and potentially universal, jurisdiction through the idea of a 
minimalist legal cosmopolitanism as a way of justifying coercion for 
―laws‖ or norms that transcend the realm of political association.87  
1. Minimalist Legal Cosmopolitanism 
Minimalist legal cosmopolitanism is ―the normative view that some 
law must apply to every person as well as to every action‖88 such that ―no 
conduct or person should be deemed ‗off the grid,‘ legally speaking, 
 
 
 84. Id. at 1060. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1061. 
 87. Id. at 1065–70. An alternative proposal for Feldman may be that the law or norm is just 
because it provides adequate security, promotes the fundamental capabilities or rests on an 
understanding of ethical theory in which well-being is primordial such as value pluralism.  
 88. Id. at 1066. 
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because of the morally arbitrary accident of where the person is or where 
the conduct occurs.‖89 A corollary is that ―we are justified in applying 
coercive law to particular persons in order to achieve the overall goal of 
rendering legitimate the entire set of global legal systems.‖90 Feldman‘s 
justification of minimalist legal cosmopolitanism requires the following 
propositions: (1) that treating acts as arbitrary conflicts with any 
purportedly moral concept of a ―legal‖ system; (2) that ―the summed set of 
legal institutions, taken as a whole, must satisfy some basic moral 
standards,‖91 not because these institutions are in any political association 
with each other such as a treaty, but ―simply that they coexist within a 
world and their moral legitimacy cannot adequately be assessed in 
isolation;‖92 and (3) that ―it is not that the state exercises its citizens‘ 
delegated right to punish, but rather that the act of establishing a legal 
system that exercises coercive power subjects the system itself to certain 
moral duties, among them the duty not to make arbitrary distinctions 
among persons.‖93  
For Feldman, to say that the act of torture or terrorism is illegal in one 
country, but legal or permissible across a nearby border, is morally 
arbitrary. Such a result fails to appreciate the cosmopolitan emphasis on 
individuals as rights-bearers (individualist moral cosmopolitanism), or, 
alternatively, species members possessing certain human capabilities 
(capabilities cosmopolitanism), as the fundament of moral obligations. 
More importantly, it fails to hold the entire system of legal systems to the 
duty to not make morally arbitrary distinctions among persons, which is 
arguably essential to a code of law. Feldman‘s argument proceeds from a 
view of legal systems as subject to internal and external legitimacy 
constraints that generate moral duties: a legal system may be internally 
illegitimate by sanctioning arbitrary treatment or the entire system of legal 
systems may be illegitimate if they treat strangers arbitrarily by failing to 
ensure that some law covers their actions. Feldman argues that ―[n]ot all 
law must reach everywhere, but every place and person must be subject to 
some law.‖94 Thus, he does not claim that all laws that are deemed 
legitimate apply globally, but that some legitimate local law covers all 
actions and persons.
95
  
 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1066. 
 93. Id. at 1063 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. at 1066. 
 95. This distinction is meant to carve out what would be the difference between extraterritorial 
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Feldman‘s attempts to derive a legal duty from a set of moral 
universals or norms, which, in his view, trump culturally defined ethical 
norms. This perspective appears to rest on some fundamental natural law 
understanding that there are discernible ―just‖ laws, which generate an 
obligation of enforcement of these laws on those that have fallen off the 
moral and legal grid. Feldman‘s argument for a system-derived duty 
requires initial acceptance of these problematic premises. The practical 
difficulty is that such a thin set of moral universals–for instance, the legal 
recognition of crimes against humanity under current international law, 
would require both interpretation and enforcement by strangers. 
Preventative wars against dictatorial regimes resembling the United 
States‘s war against Iraq under George W. Bush as well as extraordinary 
rendition could be viewed as the fulfillment of some ―just‖ law or 
obligation. Likewise, many so-called terrorists or revolutionaries claim to 
have access to divine ―just‖ law that they claim create obligations on them 
to perform acts considered heinously unjust. Who in the international 
community is going to interpret and arbitrate between competing 
conceptions of ―just‖ laws? Feldman‘s intuitions may comport to our 
understanding of some norms of international law, but it would ultimately 
cause more harm than good, particularly if he intends to enforce norms 
that do not enjoy a high degree of consensus; further, they fail to refute the 
claim that legal duties are derived from political association or consent.  
II. VALUE PLURALISM AND LIBERAL POLITICAL MORALITY 
Value pluralism offers another critique of the legal concept of a 
political duty as well as a challenge to both moral and legal 
cosmopolitanism. This critique has two main themes: (1) the practical 
deficiencies of arbitrating between competing notions of ―just‖ laws, and 
(2) the pluralist emphasis on communal well-being—and not the 
individual—as fundamental, requiring an ethical theory be more inclusive 
of local, nonliberal forms of life that enhances well-being, but offend 
liberal political values. 
 
 
application of one state‘s laws and a grant of universal jurisdiction. This distinction proves untenable, 
in my view, under Feldman‘s theory. 
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A. The Thesis of Value Pluralism 
Pluralism is a species of moral realism that rejects both monism
96
 and 
ranks among values. Isaiah Berlin‘s thesis of value pluralism is premised 
on the rejection of monistic conceptions of value, which either reduce 
goods to a common metric (utilitarianism, for example) or create 
comprehensive hierarchies of goods and the commitment that human well-
being or flourishing is primordial to ethical reasoning.
97
 In riposte to 
monistic conceptions of value, Berlin suggested that there are plurality of 
substantive values or goods that often conflict with each other.  
Berlinian pluralism functions on three levels. First, Berlin claims that 
within any given ethical framework or morality there will arise conflicts 
between equally ultimate values, conflicts which cannot be resolved by 
theoretical or practical reason.
98
 For example, the United States‘ political 
and judicial system is constantly faced with issues where the demands of 
security and liberty or the substantive value represented by due process 
rights are in conflict with one another. Secondly, there are conflicts within 
a single, internally complex value. Thirdly, there are whole forms of life 
that generate certain moral virtues that cannot be combined within the 
same culture at the same time.
99
 John Gray captures this point, claiming 
that ―there are goods that have as their matrices social structures that are 
uncombinable; these goods, when they are incommensurables, are also 
constitutively uncombinable.‖100 
Berlin‘s denial of a unitary rational standard for comparison between 
conflicting values demonstrates that Berlin‘s pluralism moves beyond 
traditional Western Enlightenment commitments. It is essential, however, 
that pluralism is construed as a species of moral realism and not moral 
relativism: it is a central feature of pluralism that there are objective 
values, and that distinctions between good and evil can be rationally 
defensible. However, pluralists insist that values cannot be fully ranked or 
ordered in anything other than a particularistic manner. While moral 
relativism, in its most robust form, asserts that all values are ultimately 
contingent products of local practices,
101
 value pluralism affirms the 
 
 
 96. Monism is the moral position that posits that goods are objective and can be either ranked in 
terms of priority or can be valued according to a common metric.  
 97. The heterogeneity of value does not, however, permit provisional lexical rankings of goods 
given the structure of a given situation. 
 98. JOHN GRAY, ISAIAH BERLIN 43–44 (1995).  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 44. 
 101. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY (1989). 
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presence of objective moral goods at a high level of generality, and as such 
is a form of realism. Berlin‘s notion of conflicts of value presupposes the 
existence of values, not their relativity. 
In life there are moral, political and legal dilemmas in which 
individuals, legislatures and courts must choose between two or more 
goods that are not rationally comparable. In The Prince, Machiavelli 
illustrated this notion by arguing that it is impossible to combine the 
virtues of duty to one‘s government or country with the general demands 
of morality.
102
 Functionally, the reality of choice between conflicting 
values implies that there are moral risks that cannot be avoided:
103
 all that 
can be done is to ensure that all the relevant factors in a dilemma are 
sufficiently appreciated. While a constitution or a system of judicial 
procedure may enable resolution of particular conflicts of value, on a 
theoretical level Berlin insists that people must decide without ever 
reconciling the relevant goods in conflict in a particular situation. The 
element of voluntarism that Berlin commits himself to is not, for him at 
least, a product of skepticism, incomplete information or anything that 
could be resolved more successfully by continued deliberations. There are 
instances where one simply has to choose between incompatible, or 
incommensurable, ends. In such situations, choice between goods is 
somewhat underdetermined by reason, rendering choice a function of a 
groundless commitment.
104
  
1. The Concept of Incommensurability  
If values are qualitatively heterogeneous, as Berlin claims, then it 
follows that their qualitative distinctness prohibits the possibility of 
judging forms of life or goods along a singular metric or scale. Joseph Raz 
describes the denial of a unitary metric for valuation as value 
incommensurability. Raz defines value incommensurability as a failure in 
transitivity: two valuable options are ―incommensurable if (1) neither is 
better than the other, and (2) there is (or could be) another option, which is 
better than one but is not better than the other.‖105 To say that values are 
incommensurable is to say that they cannot be rationally compared.
106
 The 
 
 
 102. See, e.g., NICCOLI MACCHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE (W.K. Marriot trans., 2006) (1532). 
 103. ISAIAH BERLIN, THE PROPER STUDY OF MANKIND 15 (1998). 
 104. Id. This does not foreclose, for example, members of a legislature or judiciary from engaging 
in reason giving, only that such a process is incapable of being determinative in resolving conflicts of 
value. 
 105. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 325 (1986) (emphasis omitted). 
 106. There are other interpretations of incommensurability that do not deny the possibility of 
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life of a nun and the life of a mother embody substantive values that may 
be fundamental ingredients in well-being for different individuals, but they 
are incommensurable.
107
 Incommensurability thus explicates a feature of 
Berlinian pluralism to explain how moral reasoning can be indeterminate.  
B.  The Tension Between Pluralism and Liberal Political Morality 
While there is much dispute as to whether liberal political morality is 
consistent with value pluralism, it is generally accepted that ―[i]t is not 
unreasonable to fear that once value pluralism is publically acknowledged 
as legitimate, it may unleash centrifugal forces that make a decently 
ordered public life impossible.‖108 John Gray contrasts Berlinian pluralism 
with the dominant theories of liberalism in a number of ways.
109
 First, he 
posits that pluralism undermines rational choice: 
All the dominant liberalisms of our time, whether they be variations 
on Hobbesian or Lockean, Kantian or Millian themes, have a 
conception of rational choice at their heart which Berlin‘s value 
pluralism subverts. . . . Whereas all conventional liberalisms are 
varieties of moral and political rationalism for which apparently 
undecidable dilemmas arise from imperfections in our knowledge, 
understanding or reasoning that are in principle removable, Berlin‘s 
liberalism takes its stand on our experience of moral and political 
life, with all its radical choices.
110
 
The crux of Gray‘s argument is that values of justice or equality, or liberty 
and security, for example, cannot be ―insulated from the force of value-
incommensurability.‖111 
 
 
rational comparison as Raz does. See generally INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND 
PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth Chang et al. eds., Harvard University Press) (1997) (discussing the alleged 
failures in Razian incommensurability in Chang‘s introduction). Other papers in the collection serve to 
highlight the controversial nature of Raz‘s thesis on incommensurability. Id. 
 107. There is no metric upon which the goods of, for example, the experience of white-water 
rafting and the experience of getting a bonus for work performance can be compared or assessed. One 
is conceivably neither better nor worse than the other, but there may be a third value, for example, 
success in learning a new language, which may be better than the later, but not the former. The values 
embodied in each choice cannot be made commensurate or ranked without doing violence to at least 
one of the goods in question. 
 108. William Galston, What Value Pluralism Means for Legal-Constitutional Orders, 46 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 803, 806 (2009). 
 109. See, e.g., Daniel Weinstock, The Graying of Berlin, 11 CRITICAL REV. 481 (1997). 
Weinstock has divided Gray‘s pluralism into three categories, which I adopt on this occasion. 
 110. GRAY, supra note 98, at 145–46. 
 111. Id. at 147. 
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Second, modern political liberalism cleaves from ―traditional liberalism 
by separating juridical questions from more fundamental issues of 
value.‖112 As a result, political liberals fail to recognize that all possible 
justifications of rights rest on the human interests they protect, which are 
themselves plural and incommensurable.
113
 This point relates to the first. 
Enumeration of a definitive list of human rights is incoherent because 
―rights gain determinacy only from their contribution to human interests 
whose contents are themselves complex and variable and which may 
encompass conflicts that are not rationally arbitrable.‖114 Both the 
Rawlsian attempt to generate lexical orderings of principles in justice as 
fairness and the cosmopolitan capabilities approach to justify action to 
secure a set of capabilities are thus arguably undermined. Prioritization 
and exclusive lists are inherently indeterminate absent a concrete human 
interest. If values are irreducibly diverse and conflicting, then, ex 
hypothesi, so are the human interests they protect. This need not imply that 
there are no limits to the range of possible human interests worthy of 
protection as ―human rights.‖ It merely elucidates the fact that any scheme 
of basic rights cannot cover the range of diverse human interests that those 
rights protect, and, therefore, no regulative principles can solve conflicts 
of value once and for all—though both Rawls and the capabilities 
cosmopolitans try to do just that. 
Third, Gray claims that liberal rationalism‘s focus on achieving 
consensus over the norms appropriate in politics must be abandoned. 
Instead parties embodying different and even incommensurable concepts 
of the good should establish a modus vivendi. The Rawlsian search for 
consensus on principles of the institutions of government based on a 
generated value hierarchy, for example, is doomed to fail because no 
consensus is possible on the level of value. Only pragmatic political 
settlements are consonant with value plurality and incommensurability, 
especially when understood in terms of conflicts of whole ways of life, 
which involve substantive goods. 
Finally, value pluralism entails as a matter of logic that political 
justification be contingent.
115
 Accordingly, Gray claims that ―if value-
pluralism is true, the range of forms of genuine human flourishing is 
considerably larger than can be accommodated within liberal forms of life. 
 
 
 112. Weinstock, supra note 109, at 482. 
 113. Id. 
 114. GRAY, supra note 98, at 148. See also Raz, supra note 105. Joseph Raz advances a similar 
characterization of rights in The Morality of Freedom, chapters 7 and 8. 
 115. Weinstock, supra note 109, at 482. 
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. . . [V]alue-pluralism cannot mandate liberalism, where that is taken to be 
a theory or set of principles claiming universal authority.‖116  
But is Gray correct to say that, as a matter of logic, value pluralism 
undermines liberalism even on historicist grounds? It remains to be seen as 
to whether liberalism has as little appeal politically as Gray claims once it 
has abandoned its pretense to universality or a definite list of human rights 
or capabilities. Nonetheless, in supporting his argument against liberalism, 
Gray argues that what follows from the pluralist thesis is ―that liberal 
institutions can have no universal authority.‖117 According to Gray, 
―[w]here liberal values come into conflict with others which depend for 
their existence on non-liberal social or political structures . . . and where 
values are truly incommensurable, there can . . . be no argument according 
universal authority to liberal values.‖118 Therefore, Gray concludes that 
―the relation we have to liberal practices is in the nature of a groundless 
commitment.‖119  
Value pluralism provides a compelling critique of liberal political 
morality and leaves open the possibility of an alternative concept of legal 
duty to that offered by Rawls and Locke. Because well-being is primordial 
for the value pluralism view, political association, and thus consent, is 
secondary from the standpoint of moral and legal duties. Since value 
pluralism clearly rejects the political concept of legal duty as arbitrary and 
focuses on well-being, the extent of moral or legal duty depends on its 
relation to a form of life or value and its ability to facilitate human 
flourishing, not on limitations provided by hypothetical consent. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR  
COSMOPOLITANISM LAW 
A. Minimalist Legal Cosmopolitanism Revisited 
Recall that the idea of minimalist legal cosmopolitanism is ―the 
normative view that some law must apply to every person as well as to 
every action‖120 such that ―no conduct or person should be deemed ‗off the 
 
 
 116. JOHN GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT‘S WAKE 199–200 (1995).  
 117. GRAY, supra note 98, at 155. 
 118. Id. Gray‘s argument, however, may be problematic in so far as he takes the fact that 
pluralism does not mandate liberal political neutrality embodied in liberal ideals of autonomy as self-
authorship with a historicist justification of liberalism based on the conditions of modern society. It is 
unclear why a ―liberal‖ or supporter of autonomy denies the universal authority of liberal values, then 
she avoids the fallacy of presuming that liberal values are uniquely privileged values. 
 119. Id. at 165. 
 120. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1066. 
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grid,‘ legally speaking, because of the morally arbitrary accident of where 
the person is or where the conduct occurs.‖121 Minimalist legal 
cosmopolitanism is a response to the political concept of legal duty, which 
maintains that there is no legal duty where there is no political association, 
where such an association is viewed as legitimate on the basis of 
hypothetical or tacit consent.  
Minimalist legal cosmopolitanism proposes that coercion is justified in 
limited circumstances due to a legal duty that emerges on the basis of 
species membership, and is justified in part by the moral legitimacy of the 
total set of legal systems around the world that support a legal duty against 
arbitrary treatment.
122
 In sum, if a local legal system fails to enforce a 
legitimate duty to an individual either because (1) the legal system is 
substantively deficient and lacks laws covering certain egregious conduct 
or (2) otherwise lacks practical resources of enforcement of a legitimate 
right against arbitrary treatment, then all legal systems have an obligation 
to ensure coercion is applied to the conduct in question. Minimalist legal 
cosmopolitans argue that coercion is justified by the moral legitimacy of 
the total set of legal systems around the world that support a legal duty 
against arbitrary treatment.
123
  
The ultimate goal is thus to bind national or international legal bodies 
to act where the failure to do so would violate the basic concept of a legal 
system–protection against arbitrary treatment. The sum set of legal 
institutions would be correspondingly illegitimate if they permitted certain 
morally illegitimate conduct, creating voids in the international legal 
system. The goal of extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction based on a 
duty incumbent upon all legal systems to avoid arbitrary treatment is to 
render ―legitimate the entire global set of legal systems.‖124 The 
fundamental nature of the norm against torture, as in Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, can translate into binding law (under the ATS in this case) on such 
conduct even when it occurs in a foreign country.
125
 
 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 1066. Many aspects of my argument in support of minimalist legal cosmopolitanism 
can be seen as logical extensions of Feldman‘s basic argument in favor of minimalist legal 
cosmopolitanism. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884. Even when norms are pervasive such as the norm against torture, 
there will inevitably be some variation on what conduct is defined as illegal torture as opposed to 
enhanced interrogation. The problem of interpretation becomes more acute when cosmopolitans 
attempt to establish legal duties in areas that lack the same degree of consensus as torture, war crimes 
or crimes against humanity. 
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On a practical level, minimalist legal cosmopolitanism wants equally to 
(1) avoid the alleged cosmopolitan pitfall of requiring utopian notions of 
world government to police national legal systems and (2) avoid universal 
jurisdiction where each system of law would have a duty to cure the 
deficiencies of alleged injustices to strangers by unilaterally granting 
jurisdiction to acts outside a state, thereby overriding not only 
jurisdictional boundaries, but international norms of sovereignty. To avoid 
these concerns, the minimalist legal cosmopolitan would distinguish itself 
from universal jurisdiction in the following manner: 
If some local legal system refused to admit that its laws applied to a 
given (serious) situation, then other legal systems would, in a 
limited way, be justified in expanding their jurisdiction to fill the 
apparent gap. Indeed, there would exist a general moral duty that at 
least one legal system extend itself to fill, provided of course that 
the gap be important enough that its continued existence would 
undercut the moral legitimacy of the whole summed set of systems. 
There would not need to be a single principle of universal 
jurisdiction, but some jurisdiction would apply everywhere . . . . [in 
order to] preclude the possibility of legal vacuum. . . .
126
 
Feldman concedes that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (―ICC‖) ―arguably enacts a version of this sort of minimalist legal 
cosmopolitanism.‖127 The ICC avoids universal jurisdiction because its 
―jurisdiction kicks in only when a local legal system has inadequately 
addressed a major and serious crime (crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, or aggression).‖128 The practical difficulties of distinguishing 
under what circumstances such a stopgap would kick in to fill the legal 
void in the global system, however, may hinge on value imposition or 
prioritization that fails to comport with value pluralism. Equally 
problematic is Feldman‘s implicit reliance on natural law arguments to 
justify what conduct will be unjust, and thus trigger some jurisdiction to 
apply its law extraterritorially. 
B. Value Pluralism and Human Interests 
If the thesis of pluralism is accepted, then what bearing does it have on 
contemporary understanding of human rights, particularly extraterritorial 
 
 
 126. Feldman, supra note 9, at 1067.  
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jurisdiction over human rights violations? Recall that for a pluralist, and 
the capabilities cosmopolitan, diverse forms of political association and 
moral codes are justified because and to the extent that they each protect 
distinct forms of life that contribute to the well-being of their members. 
Pluralism raises questions as to how such diverse forms of political 
association (and legal systems) are to be assessed in terms of their 
legitimacy, and thus be subject to potential extraterritorial jurisdiction. If 
no universal comparisons of well-being are possible between forms of life, 
then pluralism as explicated by Gray is indistinguishable from relativism, 
rendering his pluralism potentially unnecessary and unjustified. 
To allay these fears, Gray shares a thin, though by no means identical, 
universalism with cosmopolitans in which well-being is in part an 
objective matter. Political legitimacy therefore depends fundamentally on 
well-being, which must include some notion of basic ―rights‖ based on 
universal interests. For instance, Gray argues that ―[t]here are some rights 
that all regimes must meet if they are to be reasonably legitimate in 
contemporary conditions; but the rights that such regimes protect are not 
all the same.‖129 Moreover, human rights are ―not immutable truths. . . . 
[t]hey are conventions, whose content vary as circumstances and human 
interests vary.‖130 While rights will differ from society to society, this still 
commits Gray to some notion of shared fundamental rights protecting 
generically human interests. Gray elaborates on the notion of legitimacy in 
the following way by claiming that in ―contemporary circumstances, all 
reasonably legitimate regimes require a rule of law and the capacity to 
maintain peace, effective representative institutions, and a government that 
is removable by its citizens without recourse to violence.‖131 
The legitimacy of a regime hinges in part on the satisfaction of these 
factors. Gray, however, is quick to note that it is ―impossible to specify 
necessary and sufficient conditions of legitimacy which apply in all 
circumstances, even those of the late modern world.‖132 Nonetheless, Gray 
recognizes that there is a certain limit to what is legitimate. Certain 
practices, such as genocide, torture, and suppression of minorities, render 
 
 
 129. JOHN GRAY, TWO FACES OF LIBERALISM 106 (2000). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 106–07. Gray continues by claiming, ―In addition, [legitimate regimes] require the 
capacity to assure the satisfaction of basic needs to all and to protect minorities from disadvantage. 
Last, thought by no means least, they need to reflect the ways of life and common identities of their 
citizens‖ Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. GRAY, supra note 129, at 107. 
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regimes manifestly illegitimate.
133
 The test of legitimacy, backed by the 
existence of real universal evils that frustrate even basic well-being, 
supports the view that how people are treated and the extent to which they 
are well off is not self-defined or relative. Cultural standards of well-being 
will differ, but there is ultimately a horizon of basic conditions that must 
be met by any regime whether based on liberal or communal values, if it is 
to be legitimate. The thin test of legitimacy that Gray offers seeks to 
demonstrate that there are ―minimal standards of decency and legitimacy 
that apply to all contemporary regimes, but they are not liberal values writ 
large.‖134 In this sense, Gray‘s horizon of basic conditions is extremely 
flexible, even more so than Nussbaum‘s ten goods, because it need not 
honor many liberal civil and political rights and is subject to historical 
change. The concept of a human interest–a ―right‖ or condition worthy of 
protection–is, at bottom, a historical concept subject to change with global 
conditions.  
1. Modus Vivendi and the Conditions of Legitimacy  
As a result, it is crucial for Gray that satisfying the basic conditions of 
legitimacy will in no way lead to a convergence on the best form of 
government, and, still less, on the best way to resolve conflicts of values. 
This amounts to the rejection of the search for consensus discussed earlier 
in the Part II, which animates liberalisms of Rawls and Dworkin. The test 
of good governance is accordingly rather low: the effective resolution of 
conflicts of values consistent with the minimal standards of legitimacy. 
But there is no algorithmic way of resolving conflicts of value in advance. 
Gray argues that the shape of ―a pluralist modus vivendi . . . cannot be 
specified independently of the circumstances that occasion a need for it. 
The terms of political settlement may vary from context to context,‖135 
which suggests that theory cannot provide independent foundations for 
 
 
 133. Gray‘s thin universalism based on well-being is characterized as follows:  
Regimes in which genocide is practised, or torture institutionalized, that depend for their 
continuing existence on the suppression of minorities, or of the majority, which humiliate 
their citizens or those who coexist with them in society, which destroy the common 
environment, which sanction religious persecution, which fail to meet basic human needs in 
circumstances where that is practically feasible or which render impossible the search for 
peace among different ways of life—such regimes are obstacles to the well-being of those 
whom they govern. Because their power depends on the infliction of the worst universal evils, 
they are illegitimate, however long-lived they may be.  
Id. 
 134. Id. at 109 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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settling conflicts in advance. If this conclusion follows from the thesis of 
value pluralism, as I believe it does, then there are limits to what theory 
can accomplish absent the particulars of a given political situation.
136
 This 
echoes Berlin‘s insight that in politics, and the life and law of any society, 
―principles may cut across too much human need . . . [so that] the concrete 
situation is almost everything.‖137  
Gray‘s endorsement of modus vivendi is broadly pragmatic and 
avowedly particularistic. If the thesis of value pluralism is embraced, as 
many liberal theorists purportedly do, the search for consensus on the right 
as well as the good is not actually incoherent in all contexts, as Gray 
seems to argue. But it is likely to be impossible to find such a consensus in 
the contemporary world. The task of modus vivendi politics is thus the 
humble project of staying afloat and avoiding the rocks. It demands a 
search for accommodation between parties who have divergent, and even 
incommensurable, concepts of the good. I would suggest, however, that 
the search for the terms of agreement is not vitiated by incommensurable 
ethical codes and forms of reasoning. On the contrary, as Gray argues, 
communities based on divergent principles with little in common often 
reach modus vivendi, and that this is desirable in politics. Summarily, the 
two loose requirements on modus vivendi are that they establish some 
modicum of peace and allow distinct cultures or forms of life to flourish 
uninhibited. 
At first glance, it seems that letting parties accept agreement on 
pragmatic terms consistent with the minimum content of morality based 
on contingent circumstances is admirably pluralistic. It permits various 
forms of cultural life to determine the significance of a given context 
without reference to any substantial concepts of the good. A provincial 
tribe or religion may be granted exclusive jurisdiction over religious 
matters but simultaneously be subject to laws of a nation-state embodying 
the minimum content of legitimacy. However, modus vivendi has been 
criticized on a number of levels. It has been argued that the ―notion of the 
good implicit in Gray‘s modus vivendi amounts either to an unstable and 
reductionist reliance on self-interest on the one hand, or a narrow and 
unqualified appeal to peace and stability‖ 138 on the other. It has also been 
 
 
 136. It is noteworthy that the capabilities approach argued for by Nussbaum could be framed in a 
context-dependent manner, enabling it to avoid the pitfalls of other liberalisms and the value pluralist 
critique. Pluralists view the capabilities approach and its pretense to universality as tantamount to 
prioritizing certain ―rights‖ over others in an unjustifiable manner.  
 137. BERLIN, supra note 103, at 15.  
 138. GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM & VALUE PLURALISM 122 (2002) (emphasis added). 
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argued that it cannot adequately deal with diversity and demands of 
reasonable justification ubiquitous in modern political life.
139
 Nonetheless, 
pluralism, like cosmopolitanism, provides an argument for justifying 
moral, as opposed to legal, duties to strangers through ensuring well-being 
and the legitimacy of certain regimes. 
C. The Search for Common Ground 
The value pluralist maintains that some values are constitutively 
incommensurable because no metric or standard can determine a value‘s 
priority without doing violence to the underlying values at stake. 
However, because value pluralism takes well-being as primordial, it 
recognizes that there are conditions that are so undignified that human 
flourishing is impossible—such as under certain regimes mentioned 
above. The critical issue between pluralists and cosmopolitans, therefore, 
is that pluralists permit an arguably wider range of communal life forms, 
of laws and religious practices, which do not correspond to the political 
morality of liberalism such as comprehensive civil, political, economic 
and social rights. 
The divergence between value pluralists and cosmopolitans is largely 
over what is a human ―right‖ or ―interest‖ and the extent to which liberal 
values can justifiably be imposed on strangers through extraterritorial state 
action. Recall that for the value pluralist there are no human rights outside 
the interests they protect, which are extremely variable. As mentioned in 
Part II, the values embodied in various forms of life, for example, in 
religions or other communal forms of existence that deny liberty any 
priority or individuals certain rights is compatible with value pluralism, 
but not cosmopolitans. In sum, value pluralists do not accept any 
prioritization of liberal autonomy over a communal value such as 
contribution to a tribe or family. To the extent that cosmopolitans endorse 
an expansive vision of human rights that includes liberal civil and political 
rights, pluralists will see such an approach as flawed because it protects 
highly specific and variable human interests and not fundamental rights 
necessary for well-being.  
Nonetheless, the gap between cosmopolitans and pluralists is narrow in 
part because they share a consequentialist approach to ethical duties that 
relies on human well-being. Thus, neither theory thinks that torture can be 
morally justified. First, both value pluralism and Nussbaum‘s 
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cosmopolitanism argue that the political concept of legal duty is based on 
an arbitrary moral fact: what political association you belong to or where 
you live. Second, both cosmopolitans and pluralists share a commitment to 
well-being that trumps justification of a moral or political theory based on 
rational choice or consent. 
Minimal legal cosmopolitanism is based on a concept of law that has as 
its goal the legitimacy of the sum set of legal systems based on the concept 
of filling jurisdictional gaps only for the particularly heinous crimes. The 
problem with minimalist legal cosmopolitanism is twofold: first, a global 
legal duty does not necessarily flow from a global moral duty, as Feldman 
suggests, and second, it creates significant practical dangers that would 
result in different legal regimes intervening under their interpretation of 
what is the ―just‖ law to govern conduct beyond its borders. Despite 
minimalist legal cosmopolitanism‘s primary objective is preventing 
arbitrary treatment and protecting human rights, it is practically dangerous 
because it is easily subject to capture by powerful states. A fuller 
exposition of the conditions under which a state or international institution 
may act to prevent arbitrary treatment and human rights abuses outside its 
jurisdiction is critical for the international system, and value pluralism 
provides a cautious reminder of the need to be sensitive to local values that 
conflict with liberal political morality.  
CONCLUSION 
In practice, extraterritorial jurisdiction is grounded in political, as 
opposed to legal, considerations, which arise out of complex national 
interests including the promotion of certain values or norms that transcend 
any political associations or treaty. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality in the United States is in part born from the insight that it 
is hard to justify selective extensions to non-citizens however politically 
expedient it may seem. Nonetheless, states may see extraterritorial 
jurisdiction as a way of using law to promoting various political goals 
such as advancing international law and human rights. With the increasing 
prominence of international human rights law, extraterritorial statutes such 
as the ATS have enabled human rights plaintiffs to seek a tort remedy 
against both individuals and corporations
140
 for violations of the law of 
 
 
 140. Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1019–20 (emphasizing that ―the distinction between a principle of 
[customary international] law, which is a matter of substance, and the means of enforcing it, which is a 
matter of procedure or remedy‖ is critical to appreciating that international law imposes obligations 
and the ―individual nations must decide how to enforce them‖ whether it is against individuals or 
corporations). 
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nations. The increasing amount of ATS litigation in the Circuits courts
 
and 
Supreme Court decisions, such as Boumediene v. Bush,
141
 also 
demonstrate that the importance of extraterritorial jurisdiction is only 
increasing. While an increase in ATS litigation has advanced the cause of 
international human rights, selective application of national law to the 
conduct of non-citizens could be extremely problematic if used to serve 
less praiseworthy ends. From this theoretical perspective, minimalist legal 
cosmopolitanism is problematic at best. 
Recall that cosmopolitanism attempts to develop an international 
system based on moral and legal duties that extend beyond political 
boundaries. Cosmopolitan law is based on the idea that there is a duty to 
obey certain laws, which arises out of a common minimal conception of 
justice. The legal obligation of the cosmopolitan is based on the 
requirement that the sum set of legal institutions can be legitimate only by 
action to prevent arbitrary treatment in places where the law ceases to exist 
or is severely deficient. Both cosmopolitanism and value pluralism 
demonstrate that the political concept of legal duty is deeply problematic 
and fails to comport with the current international system. Nonetheless, 
value pluralism offers a critique of liberal political morality that applies 
equally to cosmopolitanism: the thesis of value pluralism, if accepted, 
demonstrates that liberal values do not deserve priority over other values 
or forms of life that reject the liberal commitment to autonomy as self-
authorship and the litany of civil, political, economic and social values that 
flow from such a commitment.  
Minimalist legal cosmopolitanism is also profoundly dangerous 
because its application will depend on the interpretation and exercise of 
legal authority by one community over another. More powerful states will 
be more capable of exploiting less powerful states by using extraterritorial 
or universal jurisdiction to reach activity that it finds unjust. Political 
morality is invariably more pluralist internationally than domestically, 
making value judgments on when there exists a legal obligation to extend 
law abroad all the more problematic. Such a pronounced divergence in 
political morality does not mean that gross human rights violations should 
not be met with some form of legal or political sanction, but, more 
modestly, that cosmopolitanism may lead to violations of local political 
morality. Such violations could do more damage than good by fostering 
resentment by those whose law, norms or tradition is being displaced. In 
this respect, cosmopolitan law is perhaps most problematic when it 
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extends to civil, political, economic and social rights that do not enjoy the 
same degree of consensus as other norms codified in international law. In 
a world where borders are becoming increasingly anachronistic, value 
pluralism provides reason for caution not only in assessing when a norm is 
of fundamental importance to the international community, but equally in 
determining under what conditions a norm or value can justify a grant of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to cure a moral harm abroad in the absence of 
any overarching agreement. 
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